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Title: Espírito Santo Saúde: The Bidding War 
This case study describes the current situation of Espírito Santo Saúde, which 
involved an eventful takeover process. The company initially went public on February 
2014 and later that year, due to the financial situation of its holdings it had to be sold. 
The bidding war began in August 2014, after Ángeles announced the first offer. Other 
participants who also pitched bids include José de Mello Saúde, UnitedHealth and 
Fosun. Furthermore, the potential projects Espírito Santo Saúde was considering 
implementing prior to the sale and the current situation of the healthcare industry in 
Portugal, will also be analysed.  
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Espírito Santo Saúde: The Bidding War 
August 3, 2014 was an unforgettable day for one of the richest Portuguese families. 
Banco Espírito Santo (“BES”), which was part of the financial empire built by the 
Espírito Santo family, was bailed out and split into a good and bad bank, after reporting 
a net loss in the first half of 2014 of around €3.6bn. In the wake of this event, 
everything changed. The Group desperately needed to raise money and would 
consequently sell its most profitable assets, which was the case of Espírito Santo Saúde 
(“ES Saúde” or “ESS”). See exhibit 1 with the structure of the Group Espírito Santo 
(“GES” or “Group”). 
Later that month, on a sunny summer day in August, Ángeles, the Mexican group 
that operated in the healthcare industry, pitched its bid to acquire ESS. The bid marked 
the beginning of what would become an eventful takeover process lasting around 9 
weeks and including several participants. Although the outcome was unpredictable, the 
high number of companies trying to acquire ESS and the proposal of the Portuguese 
Communist Party to nationalise the company was proof that ESS was indeed a 
profitable and attractive company, despite all the problems its holdings were facing.  
Espírito Santo Group: The Fall of an Empire 
The origins of the group date back to 1869, when the 19-year-old José Maria do 
Espírito Santo e Silva created a foreign exchange business, where he traded credit 
securities and lottery tickets. Some decades later, in 1884, he began establishing several 
other companies dealing with banking operations and securities, one of them that, in the 
future, would become BES. After José Maria do Espírito Santo e Silva’s death in 1915 
BES was managed by his three sons and as from the late 1920s entered into a phase of 
great expansion. In 1937, BES merged with Banco Comercial de Lisboa. From then on, 
the bank began expanding and consolidating its position within the banking industry, 
entered in the insurance business throughout the acquisition of Companhia de Seguros 





of April 1974, came the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, which was intrinsically 
related to the nationalisation of the Portuguese banking and insurance sectors in March 
1975. As a consequence, many members of the Espírito Santo family were forced to 
emigrate, mainly to Brazil, the United Kingdom and Switzerland.  
By the late 1980s, the Portuguese government invited the family to come back, and 
following the reprivatisation of the insurance company, Tranquilidade, in 1989, and 
BES, in 1991, the Group started to rebuild its operations in Portugal, investing not only 
in the banking and insurance sector but also in the real estate, tourism, communications 
and other miscellaneous services, through the creation of different companies. Some 
senior Portuguese business figures postulate that the origins of the family’s eventual 
financial catastrophe lie in this period. The desire of regaining control of the bank was 
achieved using only a small amount of the family’s capital together with huge amount 
of leverage. “They put in practically zero capital from the start, it was always leverage”, 
said one Lisbon banker
i
. In addition, once BES doubled its market share, the family 
increased its leverage even more to build up interests in other sectors using its stake in 
the bank as collateral. This situation worsened with the financial crisis that drove 
Portugal into an international bailout in 2011. The bank was forced to cut dividends and 
raise new capital, which led to a great decrease of the family’s stake in BES. Already, 
some wondered if and how was possible that BES was able to raise capital in the market 
when the other Portuguese banks were instead being bailed out by the government. 
Moreover, some argue it was at this point, due to a lack of access to the market 
financing, that BES resorted to substitutes for the debt. Regulators started noticing that 
Rioforte and Espírito Santo International (“ESI”) were selling risky short-term 
commercial papers to the retail and institutional clients of BES, throughout a BES-
owned fund, Espírito Santo Liquidez, which raised €1.7bn in debt.  
Since ESI was a private company, there was limited information regarding its 
financial situation. Regardless it is very difficult to hide all of the firm’s problems and 
as the European financial crisis tightened in mid-2013 the family was forced to yet 
again raise more debt making the market privy of some of the family holdings’ 
problems. Rio Forte disclosed a value of debt equal to €2.9bn, which represented 
roughly 35x EBIT
1
. The CEO of BES, Ricardo Salgado, was aware that something had 
to be done, or else Rioforte and ESI would eventually default.  
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 Profits before interests and taxes amounted to €84m. Only interest charges were valued at €89m. 
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In May 2014, BES announced it would perform a capital increase of up to €1.045bn, 
offering new shares at €0.65. In late May, the market discovered that ESI had hidden 
€1.2bn liabilities that were unaccounted in its financial statements of 2012. However, 
the capital increase was successfully completed in June and roughly 1,607 million new 
ordinary shares were issued
2
.  
 One month later, in July, just before Rioforte and ESI asked for special protection 
from its creditors, The Bank of Portugal forced Ricardo Salgado to resign. After this, 
BES announced its results for the first semester of 2014, revealing a loss of €3.58bn
3
 
and impairments totalling €4.25bn, which consequently led to the family’s loss of 
control of the bank. “As the pressure increased, they allowed the cancer [of ESI] to 
infect the bank more and more”, said a Portuguese banker. “The cancer was in one 
place, the brain, but they let it spread across the whole body, and to the bank.”
ii
 
It was the fall of an empire that took around 150 years to build. From the beginning 
of June until the end of July, the share price of BES went down 89.11%. On the August 
1
st
, the Portuguese regulator CMVM
4
 suspended the transaction of BES’s shares 
(Exhibit 2). The collapse of BES was barely avoided through a rescue package that 
divided the bank in two. The toxic assets of the bank were split from the good ones, and 
allocated into a “bad” bank, as an attempt by authorities to rescue what remained of 
BES. Approximately 15,000 of real estate assets, valued at €2.0bn, were transferred to 
the “good bank”, which was dubbed “Novo Banco”, including the participation BES 
had in Espírito Santo Health Care Investments (“ESHCI”). In October, the court of 
Luxemburg decided not to give creditor protection to ESI and Rioforte, meaning that 
both companies would enter in bankruptcy and be liquidated to pay off their debts. 
KPMG had been providing audit services to BES since 2002 and was in charge of 
auditing the financial accounts of more than 60 companies within GES. Both The Bank 
of Portugal and CMVM believed that a firm should not have the same auditing 
company for more than two terms, which is the same as to say 8 years. However, in 
2011, BES announced the continuation of the bank’s relationship with KPMG as it 
enabled cost savings as well as benefiting from a better service, due to the auditor’s 
knowledge about the Group. Critics blamed KPMG for the bank’s demise, defending 
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On the June 17
th
, 2014, BES placed 1,607,033,212 new shares in the market at €0.65 per share, which 
amounted to a capital increase of €1,044,571,587.8. 
3
 In the first half of 2014, BES announced a net loss of €3,577.3m, where the net loss of the second 
quarter amounted to €3,488.1m. 
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that the auditor should have identified the ongoing money transfers between companies 
within GES. “With the auditor playing so many roles, the question seems to be: Were 
they just too spread out to see the big picture, or in the worst case were they too focused 
on getting audit mandates to act on the big picture?”, said a finance professor at 
London’s Cass Business School, Peter Hahn
iii
. 
Unfortunately, this was one of Europe’s largest financial failures, which led investors 
to losses of approximately €10.0bn. “The fall of the Espírito Santo is effectively the 




Espírito Santo Saúde  
Overview 
One of the Rioforte’s companies that showed evidence of profitability was Espírito 
Santo Saúde. The company dated back to the acquisition of Clíria – Hospital Privado de 
Aveiro and Hospital da Arrábida (“HA”), in 2000. Since its creation, ES Saúde has 
grown both organically and through acquisitions, maintaining a very active strategy in 
remodelling and expansion projects. In 2007, Hospital da Luz (“HL”) started operating 
and five years later, the first public hospital managed under a public-private partnership 
(“PPP”) was inaugurated (Exhibit 3).   
 ES Saúde has a total of eighteen facilities divided into eight private hospitals, one 
hospital managed under a PPP agreement, seven private outpatient clinics
5
 and two 
senior residences (Exhibit 4). Its hospitals offer several delicate care services, including 
surgery, inpatient treatment and diagnostic trials, as well as offering services to promote 
health and avoid diseases, such as check-ups. The outpatient clinics provide services to 
people who are not in a delicate situation, but need either a diagnosis or therapeutic or 
ambulatory treatments. The senior residences work as nursing homes and offer 
rehabilitation and general assistance to elderly patients to provide them an integrated 
residential solution. 
Currently ESS is present in northern, central and south-central Portugal. In some 
places, ES Saúde owns the only private general hospital and in the two Portuguese 
regions with the highest purchasing power, Lisbon and Porto, the company has Hospital 
da Luz, the largest private hospital in Portugal, and Hospital da Arrábida, respectively. 
                                                          
5
 An outpatient clinic provides services to people that is not hospitalized for 24 hours or more, but who 
visit a hospital, clinic, or associated facility for diagnosis or treatment. 
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ES Saúde’s strategy relies on differentiation through not only owning the majority of its 
facilities but also through the completion of recent complete refurbishments of its 
facilities, which starkly contrasts from those of the National Health System (“NHS”).  
In early 2012, ESS adopted a different business model entering for the first time into 
a PPP agreement with the Portuguese government to manage Hospital Beatriz Ângelo 
(“HBA”). HBA was a newly built facility where ESS managed its operations under the 
NHS, providing clinical and other medical services
6
. The agreement was reached in 
December 2009 and HBA began operating gradually in January 2012, having its first 
full year of operations by 2013
7
 (Exhibit 5). 
In September 2013, ESS started its Initial Public Offer (“IPO”) process, which was 
successfully terminated in February 2014. The structure involved selling 49% of the 
capital and keeping 51% under the control of ESHCI
8
. This resulted in total gains of 
€149.8m, where €22.5m were gains for ES Saúde and the remaining value was gains for 
the shareholders who sold their position in the company (Exhibit 6). ESS was listed on 
the Lisbon Stock Exchange with a final offer price of €3.20 per share. The company’s 
equity was valued at around €305.7m, which combined with the LTM Net Earnings
9
 of 
€13.2m, gave a P/E multiple of 23.2x, which was above the average of the European 
sector at the time. The price range for this IPO had initially been set between €3.20 and 
€3.90, and the fact that the final offer price (€3.20) had been defined at the lower 
range
10
, together with signals of low demand for ESS shares from its employees, 
induced investors to be cautious in the initial trading sessions. The day after the IPO, the 
share price fell 1.25% closing at €3.16 per share. However, by the end of March, the 
share price had risen 14.7% relative to the initial offer price. In a transaction where 
Espírito Santo Investment Bank (“ESIB”) was the global coordinator
11
, the main goals 
                                                          
6 Those services include outpatient consultations, supply of emergency room visits, both outpatient and 
inpatient surgeries as well as the provision of non-surgical inpatient and outpatient services (psychiatry, 
dialysis and chemotherapy services). 
7
 From 2011 to 2012 there was an increase of €2.1m in D&A mainly because this marked the first year 
that HBA would depreciate. 
8 
The lock-up period was 270 days, but the majority of the agreements included change of control 
provisions which required ESI to maintain a direct or indirect controlling interest in ESS. 
9
 Last Twelve Months (“LTM”) net earnings were computed as the sum of the net earnings of the 1
st
 
quarter of 2014 plus the last 3 quarters net earnings of 2013. 
10
 The determination of the IPO price corresponded to the last two weeks of January and first week of 
February, which was a period of increased volatility in the financial markets and a rise in risk aversion on 
the investors’ side, largely as a consequence of instability in some emerging markets. 
11
 ESIB was the global coordinator of the retail offering. Credit Suisse and ESIB were the joint global 
coordinators and joint bookrunners of the IPO. Crédit Agricole CIB was senior co-lead manager and 




of the IPO were to reinforce ESS’s capital structure in order to reduce its leverage, 
whilst investing in new projects. Additionally, this was seen as a good opportunity to 
increase visibility worldwide. Notwithstanding, one may question what drove Rioforte 
to sell part of ESS. Was it a signal of what was already affecting the Espírito Santo 
Group? In fact, ESS was arguably the only asset of Rioforte that could be set up for an 
IPO. 
The Portuguese Healthcare Industry 
The Portuguese public healthcare system is organised so that all citizens have access 
to the NHS, which is funded through general taxation and co-payments from patients 
when using the healthcare services
12
. However, around 40% of the population benefits 
from access to other healthcare services, either via an insurance plan or a special public 
or private plan for specific activity sectors
13
. Since the international financial crisis in 
2007, Portugal has faced several unfavourable macroeconomic conditions, which 
limited the public health system’s budget. Gradually, as the investment in this sector 
decreased, facilities started to deteriorate and there was a migration of the most 
qualified doctors from the public to the private sector. Moreover, in 2013 the 
government funding to the state employees’ healthcare plans dropped substantially
14
 
and in 2014 the moderation fees increased. Interestingly, as the public sector 
expenditures fell, the private sector ramped up its investment.  
In 2011, the private sector was responsible for providing around 46% of the total 
healthcare services, compared to 40% in 2007, which shows it has remained resilient 
throughout the financial crisis. Moreover, from 2007 to 2011, the revenues of the 
private healthcare providers
15
 increased on average 5.5% per year, while in the public 
healthcare sector they dropped by an average 0.7% annually. Despite this downward 
trend, the latter still has an important role in the Portuguese healthcare system, with 
total revenues in 2011 of €6.5bn, compared to €5.5bn in the private sector
v
 suggesting 
that there is room for the private sector to keep growing. 
ESS is linked to the public sector through its management of HBA via its PPP 
agreement, via services provided to patients who are wait-listed in the public sector and 
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 Moderation fees. 
13
 These are public and private health subsystems, where the access depends on their type of work or even 
their position within the firm. Some plans include ADSE that covers the public workers, SAMS, which is 
attributable to bankers and LASFA that covers military. 
14
 In 2011, government funding was 48%, which slightly increased to 54% in 2012. However, in 2013 it 
dropped sharply to 29% as a result of financial difficulties faced by Portugal. 
15
 Private health revenues include both public and private sources. 
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via the considerable portion of its revenues that come from state employees’ healthcare 
plans. However, as the majority of its revenues come from the private sector, the 
deterioration of the public health system may seem to positively affect ESS’ financial 
strength. In an extreme case, the lack of investment may lead to a complete degradation 
of the NHS, which could force patients to be treated at private hospitals. Recently, the 
health insurance penetration has been growing, meaning an increasing awareness 
regarding the competency of private hospitals. Therefore, the aforementioned trends, 
ailed with an ageing population, a higher investment in the private healthcare sector 
with considerable technological advances in diagnosis and treatment, a boost in the 
standardization of medical procedures and a greater than ever disease burden, seem to 
benefit ESS.   
ESS’s main competitors within Portugal include José de Mello Saúde (“JMS”) and 
ex-Hospitais Privados de Portugal (“HPP”), currently named Lusíadas. All of the 
aforesaid firms adopted a similar model of a general hospital that provides a complete 
cycle of services. Considering only the Portuguese private healthcare market, ESS 
currently has the highest market share and the highest number of beds. However, JMS 
was the pioneer in implementing PPP agreements and is currently the market leader 
considering both the private and the public market, followed by ESS. These top three 
players command approximately 15.5% of the Portuguese private healthcare market 
share
vi
, whereas the remainder is distributed in a very fragmented market of private 
practice offices and small clinics,
16
 (Exhibit 7) which have been losing market power 
due to the recent economic crisis that caused some small private healthcare providers to 
disappear.  
Financial Performance 
Despite the challenging economic context in Portugal, ESS continued to grow. In 
2013, there was an increase of 57% on the revenues coming from the public sector, 
mainly through capturing HBA’s first full year of activity. The increase in cash flow 
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 These small offices mainly provide medical consultations, diagnostic tests and treatment. 
17
 In the first quarter of 2014 net debt was €183.1m (debt was €213.9m ) and in the first semester of 2014 
net debt €184.1m (debt was €206.3m). 
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In the same year, more than 70% of ESS’ private healthcare revenues came from 
state employees’ healthcare plans, such as ADSE
18
, military and police forces, as well 
as from insurance companies. The healthcare plans offered to employees from private 
companies and out-of-pocket clients together amounted to roughly a quarter (24%) of 
total private revenues. Additionally, private hospitals often administered certain services 
on behalf of public hospitals, such as surgeries for patients that have been placed on 
lengthy waiting lists. In 2013, these services represented 3% of private revenues 
(Exhibit 8).  
Since its inception, ESS increased its operational revenues year-on-year. From 2010 
to 2013 the revenue compounded annual growth rate (“CAGR”) was 14.3%. The private 
sector represented the major source of ESS revenues, followed by the public sector, then 
by “holding and shared services”
 19
 and finally by other businesses, which had a 
consistent albeit smaller contribution to ESS 
20
 (Exhibit 9). 
Potential Projects  
Before being set up for its sale, ESS was considering the implementation of some 
projects. Although they had not been adopted by the date of the sale, ESS has an option 
to implement them, and as a consequence the projects should be considered when 
valuing ESS. 
All the revenues of ESS came from operations located in Portugal and as a 
consequence they were vulnerable to the country’s financial, economic and political 
changes. The company had been considering expansion and had already designed a plan 
to expand into Angola
21
, which may represent an effective strategy to diversify its 
country risk exposure. Moreover, Angola has scarce access to good healthcare services, 
consisting in an attractive opportunity for ESS to enter into a high growth market, 
benefiting also from a shared language by both countries. According to local media, the 
plan was to have ESS in charge of the healthcare management and the local partner 
would build and maintain the facility. Moreover, the investment was estimated to be 
                                                          
18 
ADSE is a healthcare subsystem integrated in the ministry of finance and public administration, which 
is responsible for managing the social welfare system of public employees. It allows these workers to 
attend not only the public hospitals but also to the private hospitals that have an agreement with this 
subsystem. As of December 2, 2014, the total number of ADSE beneficiaries amounted to 1,274,477. 
19
 It provides services common to the “private healthcare” and “other businesses” segments, such as 
management, consulting, legal and maintenance services. 
20
 The “private sector” comprises eight general hospital facilities and seven private outpatient clinics. 
“The public sector” accounts for the revenues coming from HBA. “Holding and shared services” is the 
corporate centre and “Other businesses”, include two senior residences. 
21
 The plan had been designed in collaboration with Teixeira Duarte, the Portuguese construction 
company due to the firm’s considerable expertise in that country. 
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€100m. Still, one should bear in mind the sustainability of Angola’s growth. In fact, it is 
highly dependent on oil production, whose price has been fallen. Keeping this in mind, 
Angola is expected to be hit the hardest, with an estimated loss in GDP of 
approximately 20%
vii
. Regardless, ESS has an option to open a facility in Angola and 
benefit from vast networking contacts, but so far no agreement has been reached. Since 
this is a complex process, ESS cannot predict when the construction may start if an 
agreement is reached.  
Besides the potential international expansion, ESS was also considering the projects 
of HL and HA
22
. Regarding the former, ESS was analysing two expansion projects, 
which were not mutually exclusive. The first involved building a new facility with 
roughly 6,500 sqm close to the existing one, which will add around 20% of extra 
capacity to Hospital da Luz. The other, was to add an extra floor to HL representing an 
expansion of about 5,200 sqm and a 16% rise in capacity. The cost of both projects was 
estimated to be between €60m and €70m and they were expected to take three years 
from the decision date to be fully operational
23
. Regarding Hospital da Arrábida, ESS 
was in negotiations to acquire additional space in Arrábida Shopping Centre. The 
hospital, located in North of Portugal, was the second largest source of revenues for 
ESS
24
. Although the additional capacity this project would bring to HA is unknown, its 
costs were estimated to be between €15m and €25m
25
. Finally, the fact that ESS owned 
the majority of its facilities, having only three leased buildings, enabled ESS to go 
through structural changes when needed, while achieving better financing conditions in 
the long term comparing with leasing alternatives. 
Regarding potential new PPP agreements, there was an ongoing discussion amongst 
the public that they were unlikely to appear in a near future, as the strategy the 
Portuguese government had been implementing to reduce its level of debt was based on 
PPP renegotiation contacts. On the other hand, some supported the hypothesis that the 
public system had been deteriorating as time goes on and a possible solution to decrease 
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 During 2013, the private healthcare segment had a 56% inpatient occupancy rate, while HL and HA 
accounted for 66% of occupancy, on average, which accounts for both impatient and consultation’s 
offices’ occupancy rate as well as operating rooms’ utilization rate. Other facilities such as Hospital 
Privado, Hospital Santiago, Cliria, Cliria da Amadora, Oeiras and associated outpatient clinics accounted 
for 42% occupancy rate. 
23
 Construction is expected to start in 2015 and be completed in 2018 (3 years of construction). 
24
 HL represented 44% of ESS’ private revenues in 2013 and HA had revenues of €49.5m in 2012. 
EBITDA margin for HL and HA is higher than ESS’ average. 
25 
The construction period is the same as that of Hospital da Luz. 
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investment in the healthcare system and make public hospitals more efficient could be 
the concession of PPP agreements to the private hospitals.  
Furthermore, ESS was expecting an answer from the Ministry of Health regarding 
the right of HBA to receive additional payment for services provided to HIV patients. 
One of its main competitors, JMS had already received said additional payments in 
Hospital de Braga since 2013, a hospital that is managed under a PPP agreement. If ESS 
was able to receive these payments, additional operating revenues of €2.2m for the full 
year 2014 would be expected. 
The Takeover War in a Nutshell 
Despite all the problems surrounding GES, ESS apparently cut the financial links it 
had with troubled companies within the Group. The deposits held at BES were 
transferred to Novo Banco
26
 and ESS announced that it did not hold any debt issued by 
any entity related to GES. However, the beleaguered Espírito Santo family’s main 
holdings were in need of new capital and the sale of ESS became an imminent reality.  
ES Saúde has shown over time it has benefited not only from a solid strategy but also 
from an experienced management team, led by Isabel Vaz, who has been the CEO since 
the firm’s creation. As the news started to spread worldwide, investors from different 
parts of the globe showed their interest in purchasing ESS. On August 19
th
, Ángeles, the 
Mexican private health group, made a public offer to acquire ES Saúde, offering €4.30 
per share in cash. Diogo Lucena, the chairman of ESS, promptly reacted defending that 
although this offer was “acceptable” it did not reflect the potential and intrinsic value of 
ESS in the long-term. In fact, comparing this offer price with the undisturbed price
27
 of 
€3.70, this represented a 16.2% premium, which may be considered relatively low. 
Moreover, the average EV/EBITDA of previous transactions in the hospital sector for 
the last three years was 10.3x, indicating that the price Ángeles offered could be low. To 
some extent, this was understandable since the current situation of GES may have been 
negatively impacting the bid premium (Exhibit 10). 
The Mexican Group had acquired 3.32% of the company before the takeover 
announcement, which resulted in a suspicion from CMVM regarding the possible abuse 




 ESS proceeded with an exchange of all of the terminals and payments system. Thus, 
ATM payments were unavailable and all patients had to pay for the health services either by cash or 
check. The logic behind this move was to avoid any money going directly to BES. Once at this stage ESS 
was still waiting from the decision on whether or not it would be moved to the Novo Banco.  
27
 The undisturbed price is the three-month average (May-July) of ESS share price. This was the period 





. The next day, August 20
th
, Ángeles bought an additional 
3.65% stake, bringing their total to 6.97% of ESS. After the first offer had been 
announced, CMVM declared a counter offer would need to be 2% higher
29
 than the one 
already presented by Ángeles. On September 11
th
, JMS offered €4.40 per share, which 
represented an increase of 2.33% compared to the first bid. JMS is the healthcare arm of 
the conglomerate Grupo José de Mello
30
 and has huge expertise in the private healthcare 
sector. JMS also manages two PPP agreements and its business structure is very similar 
with that of ESS. Therefore, the synergies that could appear from having ESS together 
with JMS are unquestionable.  
In response to JMS preliminary offer, Isabel Vaz, CEO of ESS, pointed out some of 
its potential drawbacks. First of all, the payment to acquire ESS would imply a great 
deal of leverage, which together with the current financial situation of Grupo José de 
Mello, could disturb the long-term strategy of ESS. It is also undeniable that as a 
consequence of the size both companies have in the Portuguese private healthcare 
sector, some competition issues as well as problems associated with overlapping 
operations could appear. Moreover, in a statement for its Board of Directors, ESS 
declared the premiums
31
 paid on takeovers in Europe since 2011 had been on average 
32%, and concluded JMS’ premium failed to reflect the share of potential synergies 
(Exhibit 11). On the other hand, comparing JMS implicit multiple with those of 
comparable international peers, it seems the offer is in line as compared to the median 
EV/EBITDA (Exhibit 12).  
On September 19
th
, Ángeles upped its first bid to €4.50 per share, which represented 
an additional €19m for the total firm’s value comparing with the first offer. 
Nonetheless, at €4.50 Ángeles’ offer price was below the €4.70 per share ESS was 
being traded on that day, meaning investors were still waiting for future bids (Exhibit 
                                                          
28 
Olegario Vazquez Rana, founder and chairman of the Ángeles and his son Olegario Vázquez Aldir, 
Managing Director, bought shares of ESS before the announcement of the takeover bid. The market laws 
defend the information available in the market should be symmetric. In fact, if there is a pending takeover 
bid, the information possessed by the party intending to buy shares differs significantly from that 
possessed by the party selling, especially if the buyer is already privy to the upcoming takeover 
announcement. Actually, after the takeover announcement the share price grew by 9%. Nevertheless, the 
investigation is still in progress and so far CMVM has not declared whether or not there was in fact abuse 
of privileged information. 
29
The counter offer price would need to be at least €.4.386 per share representing a 2% increase compared 
to the first offer. 
30
 Grupo José de Mello owns 70% of JMS. 
31
 Premium offered in relation to the pre-announcement closing price in all European business sectors. In 
2011 the premium was 38%, in 2012 it was 28%, in 2013 it rose 2% compared to the previous year and in 
2014 up to date it is 37%. 
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13). Indeed, four days later, on September 23
rd
, Fosun joined the bidding war. The 
Chinese conglomerate Fosun International bid €451.0m, which translated to a share 
price of €4.72. Earlier that year, the Chinese group snapped up the Portuguese insurer 
Caixa Seguros e Saúde
32
, which includes Fidelidade, for €1bn, signalling its desire to 
build an international presence. Actually, Fidelidade was the vehicle Fosun used to 
acquire ESS.  
Concerning JMS preliminary offer, some of the foreseen legal problems emerged. 
JMS’s considerable market share in the private healthcare market together with that of 
ESS could result in market dominance. As a consequence, JMS needed to ask the 
Competition Authority for their permission to go ahead with the takeover process. With 
that in mind, JMS asked CMVM to extend the deadline to register a takeover bid, in 
order to have time to hear from the Competition Authority and then register its offer. 
However, the deadline imposed by CMVM to register an offer was very tight and the 
Competition Authority was unable to give its assessment within the period to register a 
takeover bid. Consequently, on September 25
th
 JMS announced they would be dropping 
out of the takeover process, blaming the Portuguese regulators for this decision.  
On the same day, UnitedHealth Group (“UHG”) offered €4.75 per share in an out of 
the stock exchange deal. UHG is a healthcare company based in United States, which 
bought HPP. However, instead of pitching the bid directly to ESS, UHG was in 
negotiations with Rioforte to acquire ESHCI, who owned 51% of ESS. In reaction to 
this, ESHCI and Rioforte reiterated their availability to sell this participation, but 
reinforced they would prefer to sell ESS in a more transparent and competitive 
transaction, such as a sale in the stock exchange. See exhibit 14 with a more detailed 
analysis of the companies involved in this bidding war. 
On the following day, September 26
th
, Fosun boosted its bid to €4.82, stepping up 
again in the battle over ESS. Five days later, on the first of October, Ángeles withdrew 
its bid. At the time, it had no healthcare businesses in Portugal and as a consequence the 
synergies from this acquisition would be scarce. The reasoning behind its offer may lie 
in its aspiration to enter into new markets and the potential for Portugal to be a doorway 
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 Caixa Seguros includes five insurance companies, namely Fidelidade, Multicare, Seguros de Saúde, 
Cares and Companhia de Seguros. It is the insurance arm of the Portuguese State bank, Caixa Geral de 





into Europe. However, it is difficult to pinpoint the resultant synergies from this 
transaction (some possibilities include know-how or expertise). 
With Ángeles and JMS already out of the bidding war, the battle for ESS was 
winding down. Nonetheless, 6 days after Ángeles announced it was out of the process, 
UHG outbid Fosun’s offer and launched €5.00 per share, for 51% of ESS. Once again, 
the bid was pitched directly to the parent company of ESS. In fact, it is hard to 
understand why UHG adopted this strategy as in most cases, while a takeover bid exists, 
all offers need to be public, which was not the case of UHG’s bid. Fosun defended 
UHG should have followed the rules of competitive offerings, namely the registration of 
the bid in CMVM up to the 3
rd
 of October. However, on October 9
th
, Fosun raised its 
bid to €5.01, while declaring they considered the offer launched by UnitedHealth to be 
illegal and defending that the deadline to make an offer had already past. That same 
day, CMVM announced they considered UnitedHealth’s offer to be illegal (Exhibit 15).  
Fosun’s goal of building a long-term project favoured the firm in the acquisitions of 
both Fidelidade and ESS. Additionally, one of the characteristics of insurance 
companies is their ability to generate cash flows, which in the particular case of 
Fidelidade meant that Fosun would not need to ask for external financing to acquire 
ESS. Moreover, in September 2014, GES officially announced that it had sold 
Tranquilidade to Apollo. Tranquilidade and ESS derived many advantages from 
belonging to the same group (GES) since currently insurance companies are one of the 
major sources of revenues for private hospitals. Therefore, this represented another 
advantage Fosun had compared to the other candidates. ESS lost its coalition with 
Tranquilidade, but through its acquisition by Fosun, would form a new coalition with 
Fidelidade.    
On October 15
th
, there was a special session to discuss Fidelidade’s offer. Two days 
after this session, the bidding war finally came to an end, with Fosun paying €459.5m 
for 96% stake in the Portuguese healthcare company. 73 days after the collapse of BES, 
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Source: Jornal de Negócios, as of July 10, 2014 and Jornal Expresso, as of October 11, 2014. 
Note: [1] Espírito Santo Health Care Investments is owned by Espírito Santo Financial Group (17.7%); 
Rioforte (55.0%) and Novo Banco (27.3%). Moreover, BES (18.2%) and BES Vida (9.1%) shares have 
been transferred to Novo Banco.  
 













Exhibit 3 History and milestones of ES Saúde  
 
2000: Acquired a majority stake in Cliria - Hospital Privado and in Hospital da Arrábida 
2002: Started managing the Hospital da Misericórdia de Évora 
2003: Started the construction of the Luz Integrated Health Complex (including both Hospital 
da Luz and Casas da Cidade- Residências Sénior) 
2004: Cliria - Centro Médico de Águeda started operating and Clube de Repouso da Casa dos 
Leões was integrated into ES Saúde 
2005: Started the construction of Hospital da Luz – Clínica de Oeiras  
2006: Hospital do Mar opened; Acquired 100% of IRIO – Instituto de Radioterapia and Hospor
1
  
2007: Hospital da Luz and Hospital da Luz – Clíncia de Oeiras started operating 




Clipóvoa - Hospital Privado Póvoa do Varzim
Cliria - Clínica de Oiã Oiã
Cliria - Hospital Privado Aveiro
Hospital Beatriz Ângelo Loures
Hospital da Arrábida Porto
Hospital da Luz Lisbon
Hospital da Misericórdia de Évora Évora
Hospital do Mar Sacavém
Hospital de Santiago Setúbal
Clinics Location
Clipóvoa - Clínica de Amarante Amarante
Clipóvoa - Clínica de Cerveira Vila Nova de Cerveira
Clipóvoa - Cliníca do Porto Porto
Cliria - Centro Médico de Águeda Águeda
Hospital da Luz - Centro Clínico da Amadora Lisbon
Hospital da Luz - Clínica de Oerias Oeiras
IRIO - Instituto de Radioterapia Lisbon
Senior residences Location
Casas da Cidade - Residências Sénior Lisbon
Clube de Repousso Casa dos Leões Carnaxide
Exhibit 3 History and milestones of ES Saúde (continuation) 
 
2009: Casas da Cidade – Residências Sénior and Hospital da Luz – Centro Clínico da Amadora 
opened; Clíria – Clínica de Oiã was bought; a PPP for Hospital Beatriz Ângelo was signed 
2010: Hospital da Arrábida, Cliria – Hospital Privado, Clipóvoa – Hospital Privado and 
Hospital de Santiago were renovated  
2011: Great focus on Hospital Beatriz Ângelo; Hospital da Luz and Hospital de Santiago 
underwent renovations 
2012: Hospital Beatriz Ângelo started operating; Hospital do Mar, Cliria – Clínica de Oiã, and 
Hospital de Santiago was remodeled 
2013: Expansion of Hospital do Mar and the renewal process of Cliria – Clínica de Oiã and 
Hospital de Santiago were completed  
 
Source: Company data. 
Note: [1] Include Hospital de Santiago in Setúbal and Clipóvoa, Hospital Privado in Póvoa do Varzim, 
Clínica de Cerveira, Clíncia de Amarante and Clínica do Porto. 
 
























Source: Company data  
 
Exhibit 5 Details of the PPP agreement of Hospital Beatriz Ângelo  
 
Through SGHL – Sociedade Gestora do Hospital de Loures, ESS manages the PPP agreement 
of HBA. The prices that HBA charges to the NHS patients are contractually agreed and adjusted 
annually based on the inflation rate
1
. The initial term was agreed to be 12 years, including a 2 
year construction period and 10 years of operations, starting on HBA’s opening in 2012. 
Moreover, the contract can be extended for two 10-years terms, but the entire duration of the 
contract cannot exceed 30 years from December 2009. Additionally, ESS has a 10% stake on 
HL – Sociedade Gestora do Edifício, which was responsible for the construction but also is in 
charge of maintaining, conserving and managing the hospital’s facilities and building. SGHL, 
which is 100% owned by ESS, is in charge of HBA’s operational management and HL manages 
the building under a 30 year contract.  
 
Source: Company data and Flores,João, June 2014, “ES Saúde in good shape”,Millenium Equity Research 





Companies' employees' healthcare plans (8.3%)
Out-of-pocket clients (15.2%)
State employees' healthcare plans (38.3%)
Public hospitals (3.4%)
Private hospital beds Portugal ESS JMS HPP
North 3,325 311 144 138
Center 1,081 0 0 0
Lisbon 3,837 306 320 180
Rest of the Country 2,174 138 0 79
Total 10,417 755 464 397
At the time of prospectus, January 2014 # Shares Economic Stake
Companhia de Seguros Tranquilidade 2,655,000 3.00%
Espírito Santo Financial Group 13,384,053 15.12%
Rio Forte Investments 23,734,397 26.82%
Espírito Santo Health Care Investments 48,726,550 55.06%
Free float 0 0.00%
Total 88,500,000 100.00%
As of June 2014 # Shares Economic Stake
Espírito Santo Health Care Investments 48,726,550 51.00%
Santander Asset Management 4,934,045 5.16%
Invesco Limited 4,771,188 4.99%
T. Rowe Price 4,790,000 5.01%
Och-Ziff Capital Management LLC  4,175,196 4.37%
HSBC Holdings 3,876,307 4.06%
Espírito Santo Financial Group 3,228,283 3.38%
Fidelity International Limited 2,800,000 2.93%
Fidelity Management Research 2,500,000 2.62%
Stakes below 2% 15,740,685 16.48%
Total 95,542,254 100.00%



















Source: ESS prospectus and company data 
 







Source: Company data and Portuguese INE data as of 2011 
 






Source: Company data 
 
Exhibit 9 ES Saúde’s financial statements 
 
a) Income statement (Quarterly) 
 
2013 2014 
EURm 3M 6M 9M 12M 3M 6M 
Operating revenue 93.5 188.9 279.5 373.6 101.6 201.1 
EBITDA 13.4 28.0 43.1 59.0 15.4 28.3 
EBIT 6.3 13.9 22.1 30.9 8.4 14.6 
EBT 3.3 8.3 14.0 20.5 6.4 10.8 
Net income 2.3 6.0 9.1 14.0 4.6 8.7 
Source: Company data 
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b) Income statement  
EURm 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Operating revenue 250.2 273.6 341.4 373.6 
Private Healthcare 247.0 271.0 286.3 288.8 
Public Healthcare 0.0 0.0 52.2 82.1 
Other Businesses 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.5 
Corporate Center n.a 5.0 5.0 12.2 
Adjustments n.a (5.4) (5.0) (13.0) 
Operating costs (212.7) (227.2) (302.6) (314.6) 
EBITDA 37.5 46.4 38.8 59.0 
Private Healthcare n.a 57.5 51.8 58.5 
Public Healthcare n.a (3.5) (11.7) 1.1 
Other Businesses n.a (0.5) (0.3) 0.2 
Corporate Center n.a (7.1) (1.0) (0.8) 
D&A (26.5) (26.4) (28.5) (28.1) 
Private Healthcare n.a n.a (23.2) (21.6) 
Public Healthcare n.a n.a (3.9) (5.3) 
Other Businesses n.a n.a (1.4) (1.3) 
EBIT 11.0 20.0 10.3 30.9 
Interests (8.4) (11.1) (12.4) (10.4) 
EBT 2.6 8.9 (2.1) 20.5 
Taxes
1
 (1.2) (4.1) 0.0 (6.5) 
Net Income 1.4 4.8  (2.1) 14.0 
 
Source: Company data and Flores, João, June 2014, “ES Saúde in good shape”,Millenium Equity 
Research 
Note: [1] ESS corporate tax rate is 29% (25% + municipal and national surtax charges) 
          [2] ESS expected effective tax rate is 29.7% 
 
c) Balance Sheet  
 
EURm 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Property, plant and equipment 292.1 272.5 271.2 253.9 
Intangible assets 94.6 94.6 94.6 95.7 
Others 0.1 0.9 1.8 1.5 
Total non-current assets 434.0 368.0 367.6 351.2 
Inventories 5.5 5.4 7.9 7.4 
Trade receivables 77.5 64.1 71.3 50.9 
Other receivables 18.8 68.8 20.7 33.5 
Current tax receivables 0.7 1.0 1.1 0.3 
Cash and cash equivalents 11.0 33.3 24.3 34.8 
Total current assets 113.4 172.7 125.2 126.7 
Total assets 547.4 540.6 492.8 477.8 
Share capital 88.5 88.5 88.5 88.5 
Share premiums 81.6 47.7 47.7 47.7 
Non-distributable reserves 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 
Distributable reserves 0.0 0.0 2.2 18.6 
Retained earnings/(losses) (45.9) (10.6) (9.0) (28.2) 
Net income/(loss) attributable to 1.5 5.0 (2.1) 14.0 
equity holders of the parent 
    Shareholders’ equity attributable                0.8 1.4 1.5 1.5 
 to non-controlling interests 
    
 
Total shareholders’ equity 126.5 132.0 128.9 143.2 
 
Provisions for risks and charges 3.4 4.0 5.6 7.9 
 




c) Balance Sheet (continuation) 
 
EURm 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
Non-current bank liabilities 239.0 289.9 144.7 139.9 
 
Finance lease liabilities 31.7 23.0 35.9 27.4 
 
Deferred tax liabilities 0.1 2.9 0.2 0.6 
 
Total non-current liabilities 274.2 319.7 186.5 176.5 
 
Trade payables 27.0 20.1 29.1 23.6 
 
Other payables 39.0 42.4 52.5 54.6 
 
Current bank liabilities 69.0 15.5 83.9 66.1 
 
Tax payable 0.5 1.0 0.7 2.7 
 
Finance lease liabilities 11.3 9.9 11.3 11.1 
 
Total current liabilities 146.7 88.9 177.4 158.1 
 
Total liabilities 421.0 408.6 363.8 334.5 
 
Total shareholders’ equity 547.4 540.6 492.8 477.8 
 
 and liabilities 
    
  
Source: Company data 
 
d) Other financial data 
 
EURm 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Net Working Capital
1
 32.0 67.6 11.4 0.8 
Capital expendiures (23.6) (7.5) (32.5) (12.5) 
Private Healthcare n.a n.a (6.9) (8.3) 
Public Healthcare n.a n.a (25.4) (2.5) 
Other Businesses n.a n.a (0.2) (1.7) 
Total debt 351.1 338.2 275.8 244.4 
 
Source: Company data  
Note: [1] On the first half of 2014, NWC was €10.8m 
 
Exhibit 10 Previous transactions in the healthcare sector  
 
Source: Bloomberg, company data and Lowi, Ricardo, Walton, Jo, Weston, Matthew, August 2014, 
“Week 2Q, focus on M&A”, Credit Suisse Equity Research 
  
Announcement  Deal value (LTM) 
Acquirer Target date Revenue EBITDA EBIT 
Duke Street  Voyage Care 06-08-2014 1.9x 9.3x 17.4x 
Nordic GHD GesundHeits 19-06-2014 1.0x 9.4x n.a. 
Acadia Partnerships in Care 03-06-2014 2.3x 8.8x 11.8x 
Ramsay Medipsy 29-11-2013 1.0x 7.6x n.a. 
Doughty Hanson Teknon 04-10-2013 n.a. 13.0x n.a. 
Fresenius Rhoen Klinikum 13-09-2013 1.5x 12.3x n.a. 
EQT Terveystalo 10-09-2013 1.4x 12.4x n.a. 
Bridgepoint Oasis 02-04-2013 1.3x 9.0x n.a. 
Bupa Lux Med 21-12-2012 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Mediclinic Emirates Healthcare 27-08-2012 2.0x 10.6x 14.7x 
Terra Firma Four seasons Health Care 30-04-2012 n.a. 8.2x n.a. 
Doughty Hanson Grupo Hospitalario Quirón 09-02-2012 1.0x 10.4x n.a. 
Fresenius SE Rhön-Klinikum 26-04-2012 1.5x 11.2x 18.4x 
Fresenius  Rhoen Klinikum 26-04-2012 1.5x 10.9x 16.5x 
Doughty Hanson USP Hospitales 09-02-2012 1.0x 10.4x n.a. 
Average     1.5x 10.3x 15.8x 









































































































































































































































Exhibit 11 Market information 
Market data 
 10y German Government Bond1 1.32% 
10y Portuguese Government Bond
1
 3.62% 







Source: Bloomberg and Damodaran,Aswath, 2014, Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, 
Estimation and Implications – The 2014 Edition 
Note: [1] GSPT10YR, GDBR10 and USGG10YR indexes average rate from May 2014 to July 2014 
          [2] Historical market risk premium by Mckinsey & Company and Damodaran, Aswath 
 
Exhibit 12 Multiples from comparable listed peers of ES Saúde 
  
Market cap  EV/EBITDA P/E 
Company Country (€k) 2014E 2015E 2016E 2014E 2015E 2016E 
Spire UK 1,444 10.2x 9.3x 8.3x n/a n/a n/a 
Orpea France 2,808 13.2x 11.5x 10.4x 21.0x 18.4x 16.2x 
Korian-Medica France 2,354 11.3x 9.6x 8.5x 22.7x 17.1x 15.0x 
Fresenius Germany 20,820 8.4x 7.4x 6.5x 18.4x 16.0x 14.0x 
Rhoen Klinikum Germany 3,276 9.7x 7.8x n/a 45.0x 26.9x 22.6x 
Ramsay Healthcare Autralia 7,024 16.1x 13.3x 11.1x 30.8x 25.9x 22.7x 
Netcare South Africa 3,397 12.3x 10.5x 9.2x 20.3x 17.3x 14.7x 
Mediclinic South Africa 5,746 16.7x 14.2x 12.7x 26.4x 21.6x 19.1x 
Life Healthcare South Africa 3,415 13.7x 12.1x 10.6x 22.9x 22.0x 19.1x 
HCA holdings USA 24,731 8.5x 7.8x 7.0x 17.5x 15.5x 13.6x 
LifePoint USA 2,595 8.8x 7.7x 7.0x 23.9x 20.7x 18.2x 
Universal HS USA 8,795 9.8x 8.9x 8.0x 19.8x 18.0x 16.1x 
Community HS USA 5,168 8.0x 7.0x 6.4x 21.6x 16.6x 14.2x 
Tenet Healthcare USA 4,822 8.7x 7.5x 6.9x 52.4x 25.7x 19.2x 
Median     10.0x 9.1x 8.3x 22.7x 18.4x 16.2x 
Average 
  
11.1x 9.6x 8.7x 26.4x 20.1x 17.3x 
 
Source: Company data, Bloomberg as of September 22, 2014 and ESS Board of Directors Statement 
regarding the opportunity and conditions of José de Mello Saúde, S.A. Offer, 24 September 2014 
Note: [1] The unlevered beta for the healthcare sector was 0.85 from Flores, João, June 2014, “ES Saúde 
in good shape”,Millenium Equity Research 
 

















Source: Company data 
Note: On the 30
th
 of July 2014, the share price closed at €3.7 
20 
 
Exhibit 14 Profile of the different interveners in the bidding war 
 
Ángeles Health is Mexico’s largest private hospital network. The company specialises in high 
value medical tourism and has 23 hospitals comprising more than 2,000 beds and 200 operating 
rooms. Annually, around five million patients are treated by 11,000 physicians. 
Fosun is a conglomerate that operates beyond insurance, having activities in steel, real estate, 
pharmaceuticals, healthcare, mines and asset management. Guo Guangchang, president and 
founder of Fosun, is the tenth richest in China and is known as the Chinese Warren Buffet.  
José de Mello Saúde has fifteen facilities including private hospitals, public hospitals under 
PPP agreements, clinics and living and home services for the elderly. For many years it was a 
reference in the private healthcare industry, owning one of the biggest private hospitals in  
Portugal, CUF das Descobertas. It was the pioneer in PPP agreements undergoing its first in 
1995 through the management of Hospital Fernando de Fonseca (Hospital Amadora-Sintra). 
This agreement ended in 2009 and the government started managing it. Currently it has two PPP 
agreements with Hospital de Vila Franca de Xira and Hospital de Braga.  
UnitedHealth is by far the largest and most diversified healthcare company in the United 
States, serving more than 85 million people worldwide. The American group acquired Amil 
Participaçoes, Brazil’s largest health insurer and hospital operator in 2012. In late 2012, Amil 
bought Hospitais Privados de Portugal, currently designated as Lusíadas, from Caixa Seguros e 
Saúde. In Portugal, UHG manages assets such as Hospital dos Lusíadas and the PPP agreement 
with Hospital de Cascais. 
 
Source: Company data 
 
Exhibit 15 CMVM announcement regarding the UnitedHealth offer 
 
The Executive Board of the CMVM (Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários) states that 
on this date, UnitedHealth Group Incorporated ("UHG") has been instructed to remove the 
proposal submitted to Espírito Santo Health Care Investment SA and to refrain from acting, 
disclosing or circulating any acts relating thereto, besides the communication regarding this 
withdrawal, pursuant to Article 185/1 and Article 360/1/f) of the Securities Code. 
Said instruction is based on the disruption of a takeover bid underway on the shares representing 
the capital of Espírito Santo Saúde, SGPS, SA ("ESS") due to nonconformity with the legal 
framework concerning competing takeover bids. 
As such: a) UHG’s proposal was announced after the registration of takeover bid underway, 
launched by Fidelidade - Companhia de Seguros, SA ("Fidelidade"); b) It was announced at a 
time when it could not be formulated as a competing bid, given the period in which such an 
offer should be launched under Article 185-A/1 of the Securities Code; c) It aims to acquire a 
51% stake in the share capital of ESS - equivalent to the minimum amount that Fidelidade 
proposes to acquire and that is a condition for its bid success - and immediately after, the 
acquisition of the entire capital of ESS - equivalent to the maximum amount that Fidelidade 
proposes to acquire via its public offer; d) Although this proposal has been formally addressed 
to the majority shareholder of ESS, it was publicly disclosed in such a way that it constrained 
the will-formation of the other ESS shareholders that should be enlightened and informed;e) 
Thus, UHG is factually competing with the takeover bid launched by Fidelidade, including 
among all potential recipients (indirect) of its proposal, all shareholders of that company, 
holders of shares that would be targeted by a takeover bid that UHG should launch if its 
proposal were to be accepted by ESHC; f) Due to the abovementioned reason, UHG’s conduct 
does not conform with the rules for competitive bids, under Articles 185 and following of the 
Securities Code, inasmuch as a transaction occurs simultaneously with the ongoing takeover 
bid, thus formally constituting a different legal type of public offer, nevertheless involving the 
public disclosure of an intention to obtain the same number of shares that is the subject of same. 
 





The sale of ESS is inherently related to the demise of the Espírito Santo family 
empire. Thus, it is important to understand that although the company has proved to be 
profitable, the problems surrounding its holdings resulted in its sale. Consequently, 
when analyzing the value of ESS one should look at the environment in which the 
company operates and the changes suffered. The discussion of the case should also 
include the choice of the best possible candidate to acquire ESS and the synergies that 
each bidder could have. Moreover, the future of the private healthcare industry should 
be carefully analysed, as well as the potential projects the company may decide to 
implement. Proposed questions and solutions can be found below.   
1. What was the reasoning behind the IPO of ESS? Why was the price set at the 
minimum range?  
The problems surrounding the Espírito Santo holdings were starting to spread 
throughout all the other arms of the Group. In ESI’s financial statements for 2012, 
around €1.2bn in liabilities were not accounted for, which is strong evidence that by that 
time a problem already existed. Since Rioforte was related to ESI, those problems were 
also affecting Rioforte which needed to raise capital. ESS was performing extremely 
well and represented one of Rioforte’s most valuable assets. Before being set up for an 
IPO, ESS was wholly owned by companies of GES. The idea was to spread a minority 
stake of 49% and through this guarantee that control of the ESS was maintained, while 
also creating an opportunity to raise a considerable amount of capital. After the book 
building process has been completed, the IPO price was set at the lower range, €3.20, 
which was a result of an increase in volatility in the financial markets and a rise in 
investor risk-aversion, largely as a consequence of instability in some emerging 
markets. Additionally, employee demand for ESS’s shares was very low, which caused 
investors to be cautious. Finally, this was a sale of a 49% minority stake, which 
generally has a discount higher than those IPOs entailing the transference of control. 
2. Why had UnitedHealth decided to pitch its bid directly to the parent company? 
The strategy UHG adopted is very difficult to understand and was subsequently 
considered to be illegal from CMVM. Its goal was apparently to pitch the bid directly to 
the owners (ESHCI) of the 51% majority stake of ESS. However, UHG did not publicly 
launch the offer under the rules of competitive offering, which state that the registration 
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of the bid should have been done until the 3
rd
 of October and should have been public. 
Apparently, it seems that UnitedHealth was attempting to acquire the 51% stake of ESS 
and then negotiate the acquisition of the remaining 49% stake at a lower price.  
3. In your opinion which candidate was in a better position to acquire ESS? 
When analysing the possible buyers of ESS one should consider the potential 
synergies resulting from this acquisition. Ángeles has no healthcare businesses in 
Portugal and although it has shown its desire to acquire ESS, even before the collapse of 
BES, it is difficult to find significant synergies from having Ángeles managing ESS. On 
the other hand, JMS was probably the bidder that stood to benefit the most since it is 
one of ESS main competitors. However, the deal meant that it would face several 
problems regarding competition, which could lead to redundancies and to the closure of 
some hospitals. In addition, the holding of JMS is already heavily indebted, which 
alarmed Isabel Vaz and went against ESS’ strategy thus far. Regarding UnitedHealth, 
the strategy it adopted is unclear. Currently, the group owns Lusíadas in Portugal, which 
together with JMS are ESS’ main competitors. Thus, it would benefit from having both 
companies together, although it would probably also run into some competition 
problems, namely for having two hospitals in the same street. Finally, Fosun has 
acquired Fidelidade and gained the control of one third of the Portuguese Insurance 
market. It is unquestionable that having insurance companies together with private 
healthcare firms is a huge advantage, since nowadays insurance companies represent 
one of the main sources of revenues for private hospitals. Before the collapse of BES, 
ESS and Tranquilidade were part of the same group and ESS benefitted significantly 
from this. Having said this, Fosun’s acquisition of ESS, would pair up the healthcare 
provider with an insurance company again, bringing benefits to both companies. As a 
consequence, Fosun would stand to gain large synergies and would be the bidder in the 
best position to raise the price to the highest level. 
4. Was the price Fosun paid to acquire ESS reasonable? 
In order to analyse whether or not the price paid by Fosun was fair, one should look 
to different valuation metrics. When using multiples to value a company it is very 
important to find very similar companies as there are many factors that may distort the 
value of a firm. The main Portuguese competitors of ESS are not listed and as a 
consequence cannot be used. Since it is very different to analyse a hospital in Portugal 
from one operating in a different country, one should conclude there are no players that 
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are 100% similar to ESS
33
. As a result, one should use a wide range of multiples to find 
a better comparison with ESS. Using the median EV/EBITDA for all the trading 
multiples (10.0x) one obtains an EV of €593.0m, using LTM EBITDA of €59.3m, 
which was computed as the EBITDA of the second half of 2013 plus the one from the 
first half of 2014 (€31.0m + €28.3m = €59.3m). Regarding precedent transaction 
multiples, the exhibit 10 presents a table which shows that the average EV/LTM 
EBITDA was equal to 10.3x, which together with a ESS’s LTM EBITDA of €59.3m, 
gives an EV of €610.8m. The price paid by Fosun was €5.01, which implies an equity 
value of €478.7m (price per share * number of shares  €5.01*95.542m). In order to 
obtain the enterprise value
34
 it is necessary to add the net debt of the first half of 2014, 
which was equal to €184.1m (EV=€478.7m+€184.1m=€662.8m). This translates into an 
EV/LTM EBITDA multiple for the transaction of 11.2x (EV/LTM EBITDA  
€662.8m/€59.3m), which was higher than the average of previous transactions and 
current trading peers multiples. 
Concerning the DCF analysis, it is critical to understand and to account for ESS’ 
option to enter into different projects: The expansion of HL, HA and the opening of a 
hospital in Luanda. The latter is the less likely project as an agreement has yet to be 
reached and Angola is witnessing several problems deriving from the recent drop in oil 
prices, which has an immense impact on its GDP. Moreover, there is no information 
about the dimension of the hospital and there is only an estimated cost reported from 
local media in Angola. Thus, in the following valuation, the option of opening a hospital 
in Angola was not considered since its value would be very close to 0. On the other 
hand, both the expansion of HL and HA were considered and having the projects 
implemented was deemed probable. HL has two non-mutually exclusive projects that 
will add 36% (20% + 16%) extra capacity to the existing hospital. The information 
provided stipulates that in 2013, 44% of private revenues came from HL, which means 
that in 2013 the hospital had revenues of €127.1m (44% * €288.8m). No information 
regarding EBITDA is provided but since this hospital has an EBITDA margin higher 
than the average of the group, it was assumed that HL accounted for 50% of private 
EBITDA in 2013, meaning €29.3m (50% * €58.5m). D&A and capex, were assumed to 
be 20% of ESS’ total depreciation and maintenance capex in 2013, respectively €5.6m 
                                                          
33
 Furthermore, the European healthcare industry is characterised by the broad healthcare services 
provided by the state. On the other hand, companies from US use more leverage in their capital structure. 
34
 Enterprise value was computed as the sum of equity with net debt. 
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EURm 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Terminal value
ΔOperating revenue 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.2
ΔEBITDA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7
ΔD&A 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (6.3)
ΔEBIT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4
ΔTaxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.4)
ΔNOPLAT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
ΔCAPEX 0.0 (21.7) (21.7) (21.7) (0.1)
ΔChanges NWC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ΔD&A 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3
ΔFree Cash Flow 0.0 (21.7) (21.7) (21.7) 7.2 112.7
Discounted FCF 0.0 (20.0) (18.5) (17.0) 5.2 75.5
Sum PV future FCF 25.2
Probability 20.2
and €1.5m. Using an effective tax rate of 29.7%, the NOPLAT was computed to be 
€16.6m (EBIT * (1-effective tax rate)  €23.6m * (1-29.7%)). From 2010 to 2013, the 
NWC was very unpredictable, which may be due to the timing of ADSE payments to 
the private hospitals. However, once there is no information discriminated by hospital, 
HL’s NWC was assumed to be very close to €0 for all the considering period. With this, 
the FCF in 2013 amounted to €20.8m. Thus, in order to value the incremental FCF of 
the project, one should compute the FCFs for the remaining years and then sum all the 
discounted incremental FCFs. The project will enter its constructing phase in 2015, 
which will be concluded in 2018. The total capex was estimated to be €65.0m spread 
equally from 2015 to 2017. Upon completion, 2018 will have an increase in revenues by 
36% * 66%, which is the current occupancy rate of HL, (i.e. HL 2018 revenue = HL 
2013 revenue * (extra capacity * current occupancy rate + 1)  €127.1m * 
(36%*66%+1) = €157.3m). Following the same reasoning and expecting EBITDA
35
 to 
increase 40%, HL 2018 EBITDA will equal €37.0m (HL 2018 EBITDA= HL 2013 
EBITDA* [(extra capacity + 4%) * current occupancy rate + 1]  €29.3m * [(36% + 
4%) * 66% + 1] = €37.0m). In that same year, the depreciation is expected to be that of 
2013 (€5.6m) plus 4% * HL 2018 revenue (2018 HL total D&A= €11.9m). The 
probability that ESS will undergo this project was assumed to be 80%. See Teaching 
Notes (“TN”) Exhibit 1.  







The valuation of HA’s project has a similar approach to that of HL. The case states 
that in 2012, HA had revenues of €49.5m, which represented 17% of private revenues 
(€49.5m/€286.3m). This percentage was assumed to have stayed constant in 2013. 
However, since the extra capacity was not provided within the case, it was estimated to 
be 22%, comparing the total capex of €20m with that of HL’s project and assuming that 
HL’s construction will be more expensive. The EBITDA was expected to increase by 
                                                          
35
EBITDA is expected to increase more than revenues once EBITDA margin of HL is higher than the 
average of ESS. 
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EURm 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 … 2022 … 2031 … 2039
Operating revenue 0.0 52.2 82.1 89.5 90.4 … 96.9 … 106.0 … 114.8
Operating costs (3.5) (63.9) (81.0) (83.4) (84.3) … (90.3) … (98.8) …(107.0)
EBITDA (3.5) (11.7) 1.1 6.1 6.1 … 6.6 … 7.2 … 7.8
D&A 0.0 (3.9) (5.3) (5.3) (5.3) … (5.3) … (5.3) … (5.3)
EBIT (3.5) (15.6) (4.2) 0.8 0.8 … 1.3 … 1.9 … 2.5
Taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.2) (0.2) … (0.4) … (0.6) … (0.7)
NOPLAT (3.5) (15.6) (4.2) 0.5 0.6 … 0.9 … 1.3 … 1.8
Changes NWC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 (0.1) … (0.1) … 0.0 … (0.1)
CAPEX 0.0 (25.4) (2.5) (2.8) (2.8) … (3.0) … (3.3) … (3.6)
D&A 0.0 3.9 5.3 5.3 5.3 … 5.3 … 5.3 … 5.3
FCF (3.5) (37.1) (1.4) 3.0 3.2 … 3.3 … 3.3 … 3.6
Discounted FCF 3.0 2.9 … 1.7 … 0.9 … 0.5
Sum of FCF 25.7
EURm 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Terminal value
ΔOperating revenue 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4
ΔEBITDA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8
ΔD&A 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (2.2)
ΔEBIT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.4)
ΔTaxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
ΔNOPLAT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.3)
ΔCAPEX 0.0 (6.7) (6.7) (6.7) (0.0)
ΔChanges NWC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ΔD&A 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2
ΔFree Cash Flow 0.0 (6.7) (6.7) (6.7) 1.9 29.7
Discounted FCF 0.0 (6.2) (5.7) (5.2) 1.4 19.9
Sum PV future FCF 4.2
Probability 2.7
27%, for the same reason as in HL’s project. HA’s D&A in 2013 was calculated as 10% 
of total ESS’ D&A and the value of D&A for 2018 was assumed to be that of 2013 plus 
3% * 2018 HA revenue (2018 HA D&A = €2.8m + €2.2m=€5.0m). Thus, HA’s 
NOPLAT for 2013 was computed to be €5.0m (NOPLAT = EBIT * (1-effective tax rate) 
 €5.0m = €7.1m * (1-29.7%)). The maintenance capex in 2013 was assumed as 10% 
of maintenance capex of ESS in 2013. In 2018 maintenance capex was computed via an 
increase of 3% relative to the previous year. The expansion capex is €20m spread from 
2015 to 2017. NWC for HA was computed using the same reasoning as for HL’s 
project.The probability undergoing this project was assumed to be 65% (TN Exhibit 2).  







Once HBA is a PPP agreement and can only belong to ESS until 2039, it needs to be 
valued separately from ESS. Additionally, it is difficult to predict whether or not the 
terms will be extended, which means probabilities will need to be attributed. The first 
term is from 2012 to 2021, the second is from 2022 to 2031 and the last one is until 
2039. HBA was assumed to remain under the PPP agreement until 2021 with 90% 
probability, and due to the uncertainty regarding the extension of second and third 
terms, a 50% probability of extension was assumed from then on. Furthermore, in 2014, 
a probability of 75% was assumed regarding the possibility of receiving additional 
revenue of €2.2m due to HIV payments from the State, as well as an increase of 7% in 
2014 revenues. From then onwards, revenues will grow by the same percentage as costs 
(1%, which is the expected long term inflation). Capex was assumed as 3.1% of 
operating revenue from 2014 to 2039 and changes in NWC were assumed to be very 
close to 0 (TN Exhibit 3). 





EURm 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Terminal value
Operating revenue 250.2 273.6 289.2 291.5 300.2 309.3 318.5 328.1 337.9
Operating costs (212.7) (223.7) (238.7) (233.6) (240.6) (247.8) (255.3) (262.9) (270.8)
EBITDA 37.5 49.9 50.5 57.9 59.6 61.4 63.3 65.2 67.1
D&A (26.5) (26.4) (24.6) (22.8) (21.0) (20.9) (20.7) (20.5) (20.3)
EBIT 11.0 23.5 25.9 35.1 38.6 40.6 42.6 44.7 46.8
Taxes (3.3) (7.0) (7.7) (10.4) (11.5) (12.0) (12.6) (13.3) (13.9)
NOPLAT 7.7 16.5 18.2 24.7 27.1 28.5 29.9 31.4 32.9
NWC 32.0 67.6 11.4 0.8 12.8 7.8 6.5 8.2 4.5
Changes NWC n.a 35.6 (56.2) (10.6) 12.0 (5.0) (1.3) 1.7 (3.7)
CAPEX (23.6) (7.5) (32.5) (12.5) (18.8) (19.3) (19.9) (20.5) (21.1)
D&A 26.5 26.4 28.5 28.1 21.0 20.9 20.7 20.5 20.3
FCF n.a (0.2) 70.4 50.9 17.4 35.0 32.0 29.7 35.8 575.3
Discounted FCF 17.4 32.3 27.3 23.3 26.0 385.4
Sum of FCF 511.7
No other PPP agreements were expected to happen. Finally, it is critical to value 
ESS’s private healthcare, other businesses and the corporate centre segments. From 
2014 to 2018, both costs and revenue will grow at 3.0%. In 2014, D&A will be 7.0% of 
operating revenue and from 2014 until 2018 it will decrease annually 0.25%. 
Maintenance and expansion capex will be 2.50% and 3.75% of revenues, respectively. 
NWC will increase from 2013 to 2014, once in the first half on 2014 NWC was already 
€10.8m, and from then it will have small changes. (TN Exhibit 4). 






The next step is to discount the computed FCFs of each of the projects described 
above. In order to do that, the WACC was computed. The market value of ESS as of the 
end of June was €353.5m (€3.7 * 95.542m) and the book value of debt
36
 in the first half 
of 2014 was €206.3m, which implies a debt to equity ratio of 58.36%. The unlevered 
beta is 0.85, and using the debt to equity ratio, together with the corporate tax rate of 
29%, the levered beta is calculated to be 1.20 (Levered beta = Unlevered beta * 
(1+D/E*(1-corporate tax rate)) 0.85*(1+58.36%*(1-29.00%) = 1.20). Moreover, in 
order to compute the cost of equity, both the risk free rate and the market risk premium 
were required inputs. As the transaction involves the acquisition of a Portuguese 
company, one should take into account the country risk premium. Thus, the risk free 
will be the average of 10-year Portuguese Government bond yield from May to July 
(3.62%), which already account for this risk. The market risk premium is assumed to be 
the historic one equal to 6%. All-in-all, the cost of equity equal to 10.83% (Re=Rf + 
Beta levered *Market risk premium  3.62% + 1.20*6.00% =10.86%).  
In 2013, ESS paid interest of €10.4m and had a total debt of €244.4m. The cost of 
debt in this year was estimated to be 4.26% (€10.4m/€244.4m). Since ESS is no longer 
                                                          
36
 Note that the book value was used due to a lack of market information pertaining to the company’s 
debt, which implies an assumption that the beta of debt of ESS was assumed to be zero. 
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linked to BES, the cost of debt is expected to increase. Thus, the cost of debt in this 
valuation was computed at 5.75%. With these information the WACC was equal to 
8.34% (WACC = Re * E/(E+D) + Rd * (1 – corporate tax rate) * D/(E+D)  10.83% 
* 63.15% + 5.75% *(1 – 29.00%) * 36.85% = 8.34%). Since all the projects inherently 
have the same risk, the same WACC was used across the board. The perpetuity growth 
rate used was 2%, except of the case of HBA where no perpetuity was computed. 
Following this, the sum-of-the-parts valuation technique was employed, in order to 
gauge value of each project and subsequently the entire company (through summing the 
discounted FCFs of each project). Thus, adding up the discounted FCFs from HBA 
(€25.7m), from the HA project (€2.7m), from the HL project (€20.2m) and from ESS 
without HBA (€511.7m), the enterprise value of ESS was computed to be €560.3m, 
which implies a price per share of €3.94 (Equity value/# shares  Enterprise value- 
2014 H1 net debt/# shares(€560.3m-€184.1m)/95.542m). However, one should note 
this is the standalone valuation of ESS, which means the premium and the potential 
share of synergies was not included. Additionally, ESS will have a decrease in its 
revenues due to the fact that it is no longer linked to Tranquilidade. Note, however, that 
the increase in revenues Fosun could bring would be higher than this decrease. All in 
all, one should conclude the price paid by Fosun was fair. The price Fosun paid 
represents a premium of 27.24% ((€5.01/€3.94) - 1)), which is deemed fair due to the 





 of October the takeover process came to an end and Fosun became the 
main shareholder of ESS. In an attempt to change the previous image of the group and 
the link to its previous owner, Espírito Santo family, ES Saúde changed its name to Luz 
Saúde, underlying the importance of Hospital da Luz in its new brand. In addition, the 
new icon of the group designed to be very similar to that of Fidelidade, which shows the 
ambition Fosun has to have both companies linked. In the beginning of December, ESS 
bought a plot of land adjacent to the one containing the already existing Hospital da 
Luz, which was seen as a clear sign that it is planning to expand HL. In the first nine 
months of 2014, the net income witnessed a fantastic growth of 57%, comparing with 
the same period in 2013, due to an enhancement in operational results, as well as in 
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